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Minor: Benefits for Posthumous Conception

NOTE
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILDREN AND SOCIAL
SECURITY SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT'S NOVEL APPROACH FOR
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY IN
GILLETT-NETTING V. BARNHART
INTRODUCTION

With the emergence of modern reproductive technology,
freedom of choice does not guarantee freedom from legal confusion. One expression of this freedom is the availability of alternatives to the traditional means of conception. Medical
technology allows parents to choose from several methods of
assisted reproduction to conceive a child, from artificial insemination to fertilization outside of the womb using frozen
sperm and eggs. However, many of those choices can lead to
uncertainty regarding the legal status of the resulting child.
With assisted reproduction, children can be both conceived and
born after one or both parents have died. The rights of these
posthumously conceived children have not been fully established.
The Ninth Circuit considered the rights of children conceived using new reproductive technology in Gillett-Netting v.
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Barnhart.' In this case of first impression, the plaintiff,
Rhonda Gillett-Netting, applied to the Social Security Administration (hereinafter "Administration") for survivorship benefits for her twin minor children who were conceived by in vitro
fertilization ten months after her insured husband's death. 2
The Administration denied benefits to the children. s Although
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the Administration's denial of benefits, a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
the children met the requirements of the Social Security Act
(hereinafter "the Act") and that they were entitled to survivor's
benefits:
The determination of eligibility for benefits under the Act
turns on two issues: the definition of "child" and a finding of
dependency: Contrary to the decisions of the Administration
and the lower court in this case and the reasoning of courts in
other jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit's determination of
whether the children met the defmition of "child" under the Act
did not rest on the children's right to inherit from their father
under state intestacy law. Rather, it rested on their legitimacy
under state law." This Note discusses this shift in the standard
for defining a "child."
At the time of the Gillett-Netting decision, the Ninth Circuit was the only federal court of appeals to consider whether a
child conceived by in vitro fertilization after the death of one
parent is entitled to receive benefits as a survivor under the
Act. The ruling of the Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting is a de7

1

Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).

[d. at 595.
3 [d.
• [d. at 599. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(l) (2004) ("Every child (as defined in section
2

416(e) of this title) of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits,
or of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child (A) has
filed application for child's insurance benefits, (B) at the time such application was
filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time
elementary or secondary school student and had not attained the age of 19, or (ii) is
under a disability (as defined in section 423(d) of this title) which began before he attained the age of 22, and (C) was dependent upon such individual (i) if such individual
is living, at the time such application was filed, (ii) if such individual has died, at the
time of such death ... shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit.").
• 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2004) (defining "child" as "the child or legally adopted child
of an individual... ").
• Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597.
7 [d. at 596.
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parture from the internal Administration rulings in all cases
examined, both in the outcome and in the factors used in that
determination. Even those state courts whose rulings were in
agreement with the Ninth Circuit used different factors to determine eligibility for Social Security survivor benefits.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Gillett-Netting was limited to
the facts of that case. It is unclear whether its reasoning will
be persuasive in subsequent cases that address the issue of
survivor benefits for posthumously conceived children. With
eligibility based partially on state law, and with the majority of
states not yet having determined the rights of these children, it
is clear that this federal law will not be applied uniformly
across all states within the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, this decision demonstrates the need for clarification of the terms used
in the Act. Without these changes, the goals of the Administration, including providing support for dependents of an msured
wage earner and avoiding individual determinations of dependency, will not be met." To the contrary, variations in state
intestate succession laws that contradict the standard put forth
by the court will require case-by-case determination of eligibility for each posthumously conceived child who applies for benefits and could lead to the inconsistent distribution of benefits.
Part I of this Note describes the technology of assisted reproduction, the requirements and purpose of the Act, and the
challenges that arise when interpreting the Act using the variety of state statutes." Part II describes the instant case and
explores the reasoning of both the district court and the Ninth
Circuit. 10 The implications of the decision are discussed in Part
IlL"
I.

BACKGROUND

The issue in this case has as its source the intersection of
new reproductive technologies and the requirements for qualifying for survivor benefits under the Act. The situation is fur8 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974) (stating the purpose of
the Act is to provide support for children born before or after a wage earner becomes
disabled); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977) (discussing Congress's use of categories to determine dependency rather than requiring individualized proof).
9 See infra notes 12-71 and accompanying text.
,. See infra notes 72-119 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 120-155 and accompanying text.
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ther complicated by having this qualification based in part on
state law when those laws have not always developed to encompass the new technology. As a result, the goals of the Act
are not always met by the application of the law.
A.

CURRENT REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY

To determine eligibility for benefits, the Act relies on traditional concepts of the parent-child relationship and presumed
or actual dependency. This reliance makes it difficult to apply
the Act in cases involving claimants conceived by assisted reproduction. To understand these difficulties, a description of
current reproductive technology provides a basic understanding of the various methods of assisted reproduction.
One of the oldest and simplest methods of assisted reproduction is artificial insemination, which involves placing the
sperm (from the husband or other male donor) into the vagina
or uterus of the woman. 12 A more sophisticated procedure is
in vitro fertilization (hereinafter "IVF"), in which the woman's
ovum is fertilized outside the body and allowed to develop into
a pre-embryo, which is then implanted into the woman's
uterus. IS A related technology is gamete intrafallopian transfer
(hereinafter "GIFT")," whereby, similar to IVF, the sperm and
ovum are removed from the bodies but then are transferred to
the woman's fallopian tube, where fertilization occurs. 15 Yet
another method is embryo lavage and transfer, in which the
ovum is fertilized in one woman, and then the embryo is transferred to a second woman, who will carry it to term.'6
These methods of conception are traditionally used by couples or single women using donated ova, sperm, or both. In
most cases, the status of the resulting children is not questioned because the donating parties are living or are anonymous with no interest in the offspring. In some cases, however,
12 Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to
the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 Temp. L. Rev.
335, 337 (1994).
13 Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent· Child Relationship in an Age of Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. 55, 61
(1994).
14 Djalleta, supra note 13, at 338.
15 McAllister, supra note 14, at 64.
16 Id. at 64-65.
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modern technology has enabled doctors to harvest sperm from
the body of a recently deceased man to be used to impregnate a
woman.17 Currently, sperm, ova, fertilized eggs, and embryos
can be preserved using the process of cryopreservation for use
at some future date.'B Because of this technology, births can
occur theoretically hundreds of years after the death of either
(or both) parents. 19
B.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

1.

Requirements Under the Social Security Act

Under the Act, establishment of the parent-child relationship is important because a claimant for benefits must meet
two requirements. First, a claimant must be the child of an
insured individual, as that term is defined in the Act. 20 Second,
a claimant must be dependent on the insured wage earner at
the time of his or her death. 21 Because the term "child" is defined only minimally by the Act, interpretation of the term under state law becomes central to the determination of whether
an individual is entitled to survivor's benefits.22
The term "child" is defined under the Act as any "child or
legally adopted child of an individual."23 The Act also states
that "child" status can be established if the claimant would be
considered a child of the insured individual under the intestate
succession laws of the state where the deceased resided at
death, or if the marriage of the child's parents was invalid only
because of some previously unknown legal impediment. 24 In
addition, the following actions taken before the insured wage
earner dies can also bestow "child" status on the claimant: acknowledgment in writing by the deceased that the claimant is
his or her child, a decree by a court that the deceased is the
17 Doctor Details Sperm Removal from Dead Man, L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1995, at
20.
18 McAllister, supra note 13, at 62-63 (1994) (explaining that in cryopreservation, embryos and eggs are cooled and dehydrated for long-term frozen storage; semen
is also frozen for long-term storage in sperm banks).
19 Djalleta, supra note 12, at 335.
20 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2004).
2142 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2004).
22 [d.
23 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2004)
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2)(A), (B) (2004).
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parent of the claimant, or a court order requiring the deceased
to pay support for the claimant because he or she is the child of
the deceased. 2•
The Seventh Circuit has adhered to a strict requirement
for a court decree of paternity before the death of the insured
parent in order for the child to receive benefits!6 The United
States Supreme Court has also upheld the denial of benefits
based on the lack of a formal parent-child relationship. In
Mathews v. Lucas, as in Gillett-Netting, the fact that the decedent was the children's father was not disputed.27 However,
even though the children were born during the nearly 20 years
that he lived with their mother, the father never acknowledged
his paternity in writing, nor was it determined by a judicial
proceeding during his lifetime. 28 As a result, the Supreme
Court found that the children did not qualify for Social Security
benefits because they were "non-marital" (Le., illegitimate) and
did not satisfy any of the requirements for dependency!·
The determination of dependency is closely related to the
legitimacy of the child. The Act distinguishes marital (Le., legitimate) children, meaning those children born to a married
couple, from non-marital children, or those children born out of
wedlock, when determining eligibility for survivor death benefits."o Marital children are presumed dependent and entitled to
Social Security survivor benefits if the deceased parent was
insured. a, Non-marital children, however, must show that they
were actually dependent upon their deceased father before they
are considered eligible for survivor benefits because nonmarital children who do not live with their father or do not receive support from him are not deemed dependent.a2 One who
is determined to be a child of the deceased based on the existence of any of the conditions in §416(h)(3) of the Act is also
considered legitimate and therefore dependent. aa
,. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (2004).
26 Trammell v. Bowen, 819 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1987) (denying benefits to children
when the judgment of paternity was obtained four months after the death of the father).
27 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,501 (1976).
28 [d. at 497.
29 [d. at 50l.
.. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(l)(C) and § 402(d)(3)(A).
31 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A).
32 [d.
33 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C).
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When the Administration denies benefits to non-marital
children born after the father dies or becomes disabled, it is
because the children cannot show the requisite economic dependency on the wage earner that would entitle them to recover under the Act."· However, a showing of actual dependency is not a condition of eligibility in every case."5 Under certain circumstances, a child can be deemed dependent by statute and does not have to demonstrate actual dependency or
prove paternity in order to qualify for benefits. 36

2.

Purpose of the Act

The primary purpose of Social Security survivor's benefits,
according to the United States Supreme Court, is to provide
support for dependents of a deceased insured wage earner, including anticipated support from a parent who has died. The
Ninth Circuit has further defined one goal of the Act as being
to provide income security to family units, not simply to aid
individual blood relatives of the wage earner. 3S For example,
persons who have never worked (and therefore never contributed to the Social Security fund) are able to collect benefits under certain circumstances. 39 These "secondary beneficiaries"
are not only blood relatives, but are also generally defined as
those persons who were dependent on the wage earner at the
time of his death or disability:o
One goal of the Administration is to avoid adjudicating the
question of dependency in individual claims.'· The Administration has created categories of beneficiaries for purposes of determining dependency!2 Instead of requiring individualized
proof on a case-by-case basis, the Administration has elected to
use criteria such as age, marital status, and eligibility under
37

Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 633.
Califano, 434 U.S. at 52.
36 Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 635.
37 [d. at 634; see also Califano, 434 U.S. at 50; Tsosie v. Califano, 630 F.2d 1328.
1337 (9th Cir. 1980); Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir. 1975).
38 Sims v. Harris, 607 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1979).
39 [d.
40 Califano, 434 U.S. at 50.
41 [d. at 52.
42 Trammell, 819 F.2d at 169.
34
35
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state intestate succession laws to determine probable dependency.43
C.

CASE LAW INTERPRETING THE ACT

New reproductive technologies raise several legal issues.
This Note concentrates on the status of posthumously conceived children, that is, the newer category of children who are
both conceived and born after the death of a parent using frozen sperm, eggs, or embryos. Case law concerning this category of children is sparse. As a result, this Note explores the
status of another category of children in the context of eligibility for Social Security benefits. Specifically, this Note compares the status of posthumously conceived children with nonmarital children whose fathers have died.
Cases that interpret the Act in relation to non-marital
children discuss issues of dependency by comparing marital
and non-marital children. A posthumously conceived child may
arguably be likened to a non-marital child because the living
parent is no longer married once the spouse has died. In some
states, being conceived and born after a parent dies would preclude the child from establishing a legal relationship with the
deceased parent and prevent the child from qualifying for benefits. «
1.

Non-Marital Children

Marital children born before the wage earner/parent dies
or becomes disabled are entitled to benefits regardless of
whether they were living with or being supported by the parent
at the time of his or her death or disability,,5 Similarly, marital
children born after the wage earner/parent becomes disabled
are entitled to benefits even though they were not alive at the
.. See, e.g., Califano, 434 U.S. at 52 ("A child who is married or over 18 and neither disabled nor a student is denied benefits because Congress has assumed that such
a child is not normally dependent on his parents.") .
.. See N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04 (1991). The North Dakota statute is based on
the USCACA and states in part that "[al person who dies before conception using his
sperm or her eggs is not a parent of any resulting child born of the conception." The
statute even explicitly provides that a posthumously conceived child may not take as
an heir through intestate succession, although the child may be provided for in a will.
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04 (1991).
.. Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 634.
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time the parent became disabled.'6 Non-marital children may
qualify for benefits if state law permits them to inherit from
the wage earner, their illegitimacy results solely from a formal,
non-obvious defect in their parents' marriage, or they are legitimated in accordance with state law."
Because non-marital children are not presumed dependent, the courts will look to the father's contribution to the support of the child in determining whether to grant Social Security survivor benefits to the child.,a For example, the Ninth
Circuit considered whether a father's support of an unborn
child was sufficient to entitle the child to benefits after the father killed himself when his girlfriend was three-months pregnant.'9 The court held that a child is deemed dependent on the
father if the father's support "was commensurate with the
needs of the unborn child at the time of the father's death."50 In
using this standard, the court rejected the more stringent test
used by the Administrative Law Judge in the Social Security
Administration hearing. 51 That test required that the father
contribute support in a "regular and substantial manner" during the mother's pregnancy.52 This is significant for posthumously conceived children because they could never qualify for
benefits under the more stringent test.

2.

Posthumously Conceived Children

As illustrated in the following cases, the Administration
has generally denied benefits to children who are both conceived and born after the death of their father. The decisions
to deny benefits have been based variously on facts that would
also result in the denial of benefits to non-marital children: the
1d.
1d.
48 42 u.s.c. § 402(d)(3) .
." Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopting the test from
Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975), as the basis for determining that an
illegitimate, posthumously born child was dependent on its father).
50 1d. at 608-609 (citing Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975».
Although the child's father and the pregnant woman did not live together and the
father did not provide her with fmancial support, he did help with moving and home
repairs. The court considered this support to be commensurate with his abilities as an
unemployed person and found that it met the needs of the fetus. As a result, the court
awarded benefits to the child. Doran, 681 F.2d at 608.
5' Doran, 681 F.2d at 607.
52 1d. at 608.
46
47
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child cannot inherit under the applicable state laws for intestate succession, the child was never acknowledged by the father, there was no proof or decree of paternity, or the child
could not show actual dependency on the father.
In Hart v. Shalala (hereinafter "Hart"), the child's mother
filed for social security survivor's benefits for her child, who
was conceived by GIFT and born twelve months after the death
of her father.53 The Administration denied the claim on the
ground that the child was not the father's legal child. 54 The
Administration first reasoned that the child was not a qualified
heir under Louisiana law because she was neither alive at the
time of her father's death nor was she born within 300 days of
his death. 55 Second, the child was also considered illegitimate
because she was born more than 300 days after her parents'
marriage ended (upon the death of her father)56 and paternity
was not proven within the statutorily required period. 57 Third,
she was unable to ever prove paternity because her father had
not acknowledged her as his child before he died. 58
Hart appealed the Administration's denial of benefits. Following a de novo review, the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") awarded survivor's benefits to both the child and
her mother, based on the finding of a biological connection between the child and her deceased father.59 Following appeal by
the Administration of the ALJ's decision, the Appeals Council
of the Administration accepted that the posthumously conceived child was the biological child of the father, but it overturned the decision of the ALJ on the ground that the child was
not dependent on her father at the time of his death:o The case
was eventually resolved in favor of the claimants when the Social Security Commissioner determined that survivor benefits
would be paid to the child on public policy grounds. 61 The de.. See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions:
Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 Loy. LA.
L. Rev 251 (1999) (describing Hart v. Shalala No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. 1994)) .
.. [d. at 252.
55 See La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 934,953,954,957 (West 1997).
'" See La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 178-180, 184 (West 1993).
07 See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 209 (West 1997).
58 Banks, supra note 54, at 253. See also La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 184, 185 (West
1991)).
59 Banks, supra note 54, at 254.
60 [d. at 255.
6' [d. at 256.
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ceased father's intent to allow his wife to use his sperm to conceive a child after his death was crucial to this decision. 62
The intent of the deceased father was also one of the deciding factors in In re Kolacy, in which twin children were conceived by IVF and born 18 months after the death of their father."" In that case, the children's mother asked the New Jersey Superior Court for a determination of the status of her
children as intestate heirs to her deceased husband's estate.S4
The New Jersey state court determined that the children were
the offspring of their father and held that the children should
be granted "the legal status of being ... heir[s]of the decedent,
unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other
persons or would cause serious problems in terms of the orderly
administration of estates."65 Although not binding on the Administration, a favorable ruling would likely be helpful to the
plaintiff in her later federal claims for survivor benefits before
the Administration because the determination of whether an
applicant is a "child" under the Act is based in part on the law
of intestate succession of the state in which the insured individual was domiciled at the time of death. 66
The question of inheritance rights was also central in
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter
"Woodward"), a case involving twins conceived by artificial insemination and born 24 months after the death of their father.67
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to review the question whether children conceived and born after
the death of their father have the same inheritance rights as
natural children under the Massachusetts law of intestate succession. 68 At stake again were survivor's benefits for the children under the Act. 69 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
court held that a posthumously conceived child has such inheritance rights if all of the following circumstances exist: (1) a
62
63
54
65

66
67

[d. at 254.

In re Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
[d. at 595.
[d. at 602.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(a)(A).
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass.

2002).
66
69

[d. at 259.
[d. at 260.
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genetic relationship between the deceased and the child is established, (2) the decedent consented not only to the posthumous conception, but also to the support of any resulting children, and (3) any statutory time limitations are met and notice
is given to all interested parties. 7•

II.

GILLETI'-NETI'ING V. BARNHART

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION To DENY BENEFITS

After the Administration denied benefits to the minor children in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart (hereinafter "GillettNetting"), the plaintiff appealed to the Arizona district court.
In making its determination, the district court addressed the
question whether the children met the requirements of the Act:
whether they were "natural children" as defined by the Act,
and whether they were dependent on their father.72
7l

1.

Determination of "Child" Status

The twins' designation as natural children depended on
whether they could inherit from their father under Arizona
law." The district court determined that the twins were not
"natural" children based on the facts that they were born outside of marriage (in fact, they were not yet conceived at the
time of their father's death) and that they could not inherit
from the deceased under Arizona intestate succession laws."
Accordingly, the children were not presumed to be dependent
upon the deceased. 75 Moreover, the plaintiff could not show actual dependency; because the children were not in existence at
the time of their father's death, he could not have been contributing to their support. 76

Id. at 259.
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599.
72 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964 (D. Ariz. 2002).
73 Id. at 965.
7. Id. at 963.
Id. at 967.
76Id.
70
71

7.
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Posthumously conceived children do not fit neatly into any
of the definitions of "child" provided in the Act. The plaintiff
took the position that her twins were the "natural" children of
her deceased husband for purposes of the Act because he was
undisputedly their biological father. The district court looked
for the definition of "child" in the Act by examining the provision that is used for determining family status. 79 From this section, the district court decided that the twins' status as children was dependent upon the intestate succession laws of Arizona. so
Arizona intestate succession law has no explicit provision
for posthumously conceived children. Given this omission, the
plaintiff contended that her children should be presumed to be
included in the class of descendants that qualify as heirs because Arizona law does not specifically exclude them.S! She
also argued that the timing of the conception of the children
and her marital status at that time· were irrelevant. At the
district court level, the Social Security Commissioner argued
that under Arizona law, children must exist at the time of the
insured party's death in order to receive survivor benefits. s2
The district court agreed with the Social Security Commissioner's assessment, citing the requirement that heirs must
survive the decedent. S3 The only exception to this requirement
is for children "in gestation" at the time of their father's death. so
The Gillett-Netting twins, who were born over a year after the
death of their father, clearly did not fit this exception. Because
the children were not born during the period of their parents'
marriage and could not inherit from the deceased under Ari77

78

77 42 USC § 416(e) (defIning the term "child" to mean (1) the child or legally
adopted child of an individual, (2) a stepchild, and (3) a person who is the grandchild or
stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse (under certain circumstances)).
78 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 965.
79 42 USC § 416(h)(2)(A) ("In determining whether an applicant is the child or
parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this title ... , the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining
the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such
insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application .... Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.")
ao Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 966.
81 [d.
82 [d. (citing A.R.S § 14-2104(A), requiring that heirs survive the decedent).
83 [d.
54 [d. (citing A.R.S § 14-2108).
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zona intestate succession laws, the district court determined
that they were not children of the deceased for purposes of the
Act. 85
The district court's reasoning in Gillett-Netting-that
benefits should be denied because the children could not inherit
under state laws of intestate succession-was consistent with
the reasoning used by the Administration in the earlier cases of
Hart and Woodward. In Hart, the Administration denied benefits to a posthumously conceived child because she could not
inherit under the state law of intestate succession. 86 Specifically, the child was born more than 300 days after her parents'
marriage ended (upon her father's death) and she was unable
to prove paternity because her father had not acknowledged
her as his child before he died.B7 For these reasons, the child
was not the father's legal child and was therefore deemed ineligible for survivor's benefits. 68
In Woodward, the Administration denied benefits to posthumously conceived twins even though the plaintiff had obtained a statement from the Probate and Family Court that
confirmed the paternity of the children. 89 The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which
determined that posthumously conceived children had the
same inheritance rights as natural children under the Massachusetts law of intestate succession:o Although the decision of
the Massachusetts court was not binding on the Administration, it is illustrative of the problematic nature of the language
used in the state statutes.
The intestacy statute at issue in Woodward contained a
provision for "posthumous children," but this term was not defined. 91 The Massachusetts court noted that in regard to intestate succession, the legislature did not include any wording
that would require that posthumous children be "in utero" or
Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 963.
Banks, supra note 54, at 252 (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 178-180, 184
(West 1993)).
87 Banks, supra note 54, at 253 (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 209 (West 1997));
see also La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 184, 185 (West 1991).
88 Banks, supra note 54, at 253.
89 Woodard, 760 N.E.2d at 260.
90 [d. at 259.
91 [d. at 264 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 190, § 8, which provides that
"[p]osthumous children shall be considered as living at the death of their parent.").
85

86
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"in existence" at the time of the death of the decedent."92 The
court compared the absence of such language in the Massachusetts law with language contained in laws of other states that
expressly provide "[a] successor must exist at the death of the
decedent,"93 and "[a] person who dies before a conception using
that person's sperm or egg is not a parent of any resulting child
born of the conception,''"'
Unlike the intestate succession statute at issue in Woodward, the Arizona law at issue in Gillett-Netting did not address the issue of posthumous children, except to require that a
child must survive the decedent or be "in gestation" in order to
inherit by intestate succession. Because the Gillett-Netting
twins were not in gestation at the time of their father's death,
they could not inherit from their father. The Arizona district
court in Gillett-Netting thus distinguished Woodward on the
basis of the presence of language requiring intestate heirs to be
"in existence" at the time of a decedent's death, and on the basis of the absence of language affirmatively addressing the
category of posthumous children in the Arizona intestacy statute:· Arizona law does not address the issue of posthumous
children except to require that a child must be "in gestation"
for purposes of intestate succession. 96

2.

Determination of Dependency

A second requirement to qualify for survivor's benefits is
that the children must have been dependent on their father
when he died:' Certain classes of children are presumed dependent and do not have to show actual dependency. These
classes are marital children (including those in utero at the
time of the parent's death) and those who can inherit from the
parent under state intestate succession laws. 98 An offspring
who fits into either of these classes is considered a "child" who
is presumed to be dependent for purposes of the Act. For chilWoodard, 760 N.E.2d at 264.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 939 (West 2000).
94 N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04 (1997).
'" Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 968. See also supra note 93 for Massachusetts
statute. Arizona has no such provision.
96 [d.
97 42 USC § 402(d)(1).
99 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 967.
92

93
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dren born outside of a valid marriage, certain actions on the
part of the wage earner will give their offspring the status of
"child."99 These children, and those born to a marriage made
invalid by a legal impediment, are also presumed dependent for
purposes of eligibility for Social Security benefits. 100
In Gillett-Netting, the Arizona district court found that the
twins did not qualify for "child" status under the Act; as a result, it considered the issue of dependency only briefly. 101 The
district court found that the twins were not entitled to a presumption of dependency because they could not inherit from
their father under Arizona law nor could they demonstrate actual dependency because they did not exist at the time their
father died. 102 The district court therefore denied benefits to the
children because they found that the children did not fit the
statutory definition of "child," they could not inherit under Arizona intestate succession law, and were not actually or presumptively dependent upon their deceased father.
B.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT DECISION To GRANT BENEFITS

1.

Benefits Based on "Child" Status and Legitimacy

The Arizona district court affirmed the decision of the Administration that the children were ineligible for survivor's
benefits, and the plaintiff appealed the district court's decision
to the Ninth Circuit. 103 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the judgment of the district court.
In reaching its decision,
the Ninth Circuit first determined that because it was undisputed that the twins were the biological children of the deceased, they would be considered "children" for purposes of the
Act. 105 Second, the Ninth Circuit court found that the twins
were "legitimate" under Arizona law and were therefore preto4

99 42 u.S.C. § 416(h)(3). These actions include acknowledgment in writing by the
deceased that the claimant is his or her child; a decree by a court that the deceased is
the parent of the claimant; or a court order requiring the deceased to pay support for
the claimant because he or she is the child of the deceased. [d.
100 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).
101 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 964.
102 [d. at 967.
103 [d. at 963.
104 [d.
106 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597.
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sumed dependent. As a result, actual dependency on the insured wage earner did not have to be shown.
In determining that the Gillett-Netting twins were "children" under the Act, the Ninth Circuit, in contrast to earlier
decisions, did not look to state intestate succession laws. Instead, the court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent that had interpreted "child" to mean a natural child or biological child of
the deceased. According to the court, the provisions of the Act
that refer to state intestacy law are pertinent only when the
parents of the child are not married or when the paternity of
the child is in dispute. 109 Because the twins' parents were married before the death of their father and because the paternity
of the twins was never at issue, the Ninth Circuit concluded
the children did not have to meet any further standard in order
to be deemed children of the deceased. 110
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that "legitimate" children
are presumed dependent, and by statute all children are considered "legitimate" in Arizona. 111 The district court had dismissed the statute as being "enacted to prevent the State from
treating children of unwed parents differently than children of
married parents" and found that it did not support the plaintiff's claim. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit looked to the plain
language of the statute and determined that posthumously
conceived children were entitled to a presumption of dependency under Arizona law.
lOS

\07

\08

I1

'

2.

Intent of Deceased Parent

The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Woodard, like the
Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting, concluded that posthumously
106 Id. at 598. See also A.R.S. § 8-601 ("Every child is the legitimate child of its
natural parents ... ").
107 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598.
108 Id. at 596 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 781 n. 12 (1975) and Tsosie
v. Califano, 630 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1980» ("[T]he term 'child' includes a person's
natural children and his legally adopted children.").
109 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598 (explaining that 42 U.S.C. S§ 414(h)(2), (3)
provide a method for an illegitimate claimant to establish eligibility, and that these
methods are not needed if the claimant is legitimate).
110 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597.
111 Id;
see also A.R.S. § 8-601 ("Every child is the legitimate child of its natural
parents ... ").
112 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 967.
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conceived twins were entitled to benefits.ll3 The Woodward
court based its decision in part on a showing of the father's intent to reproduce posthumously. 114 Like the deceased father in
Woodward, the deceased parent in Gillett-Netting also expressed the desire that his wife continue trying to conceive using his sperm even after his death. 1I5 The Arizona district court
had dismissed the plaintiff's "intent" argument, stating that
the intent of a decedent is pertinent only to the distribution of
property through a will. liS By contrast, intestate succession is
governed by statute; the statute structures the disposition of
the decedent's property and the decedent's intent is not considered. 1I7 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit eliminated any need for a
discussion of the decedent's intent, because it determined that
the children met the definition of "child" without considering
whether the children could inherit under state intestate succession laws. liB
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RULING

The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Gillett-Netting represents a
divergence from the reasoning traditionally employed by courts
in determining eligibility for Social Security benefits under the
Act. In the past, courts have based benefits-eligibility on
whether a child has the right to inherit under state intestate
succession laws.
By contrast, in Gillett-Netting, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a posthumously conceived child need only
meet the standards of "natural child" and legitimacy under
state law to be entitled to benefits.12D By looking to the biological connection between the deceased parent and posthumously
conceived child, in combination with a determination of the
child's "legitimacy" under state law, the Ninth Circuit applied a
less stringent standard than what the Act seems to require. As
a result, the ruling in Gillett-Netting may increase the uncerII.

Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265.
[d. at 272.
115 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 963.
116 [d. at 966-967.
117 [d. at 967.
lI8 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598.
119 See, e.g., Banks, supra note 54, at 253 (describing Hart u. Shalala No. 94-3944
(E.D. La. 1994); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265.
120 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1), 416(e) (requiring status as a legal child of the insured
and dependence on the insured wage earner at the time of his or her death).
113
114
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tainty that is already inherent in the application of the Act.
This uncertainty arises from the fact that some states have
laws describing the rights of posthumously conceived children,
whereas others have yet to address the issue.
A.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WILL LEAD TO
UNCERTAINTY IN THE DETERMINATION OF
ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS

1.

Uniform Parentage Act

The first uniform act designed to address the rights of
posthumously conceived children was the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act (hereinafter "USCACA") of
1988. 121 The USCACA provides that "[a]n individual who dies
before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived
other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's
egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child." 122 This act
was incorporated in the Uniform Parentage Act (hereinafter
"UPA").123 Under the UPA, a deceased man is generally presumed to be the natural father of a child if he and the natural
mother were married to each other and the child's birth occurs
within 300 days after the marriage was terminated by death.'''
Assisted reproduction is also addressed in the UPA, which
states the man who provides the sperm for assisted reproduction is considered the father of the child, as long as he intended
to become a parent of the child and both the man and woman
consent to the procedure in writing. 12s In addition, Section 707
of the UPA states that "[i]f an individual who consented in a
record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual
is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of
the child. ",26 Under the UPA, therefore, a deceased father
would have to consent in writing to the use of his sperm, or any
121
122

• 23
124

• 25
• 26

Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 4(b) (1988).
[d .
Uniform Parentage Act (2002).
UPA § 204 (2002) .
UPA §§ 703, 704 (2002) .
UPA § 707 (2002).
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frozen embryos fertilized by his sperm, before the resulting offspring could be considered his legal child.
A few states have addressed the status of posthumously
conceived children, specifically their legal parentage and the
impact of this designation on who may inherit through intestate succession, through legislation modeled on the UPA.I27
However, the various statutes lead to different results, ranging
from those that prevent posthumous children from establishing
a legal relationship with the deceased parent to those that limit
the ability to do so only under certain circumstances.

2.

State Law Governing the Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children

The Ninth Circuit's decision to award benefits in Gillett-Nettingbased in part on the biological connection between the deceased
parent and posthumously conceived child-is a result that will
not be consistently reached under the laws of the various
states. As a result, claims of surviving children may be denied
solely as a result of the state where they are domiciled. For example, designation as a "natural child" would not seem to be sufficient in
a state such as Virginia, where the statute concerning assisted
reproduction is similar to the USCACA. Under the Virginia
statute, a person who dies before the implantation of an embryo cannot be the parent of any resulting child. 128 The Virginia
statute, however, has two exceptions that allow the child to
obtain the legal status of a "child" of a deceased parent. A person may be deemed to be the parent of the child if the deceased
person consented in writing to being a parent or if implantation
of the embryo occurs before the physician performing the procedure learns of the person's death. 129 However, a second Virginia statute expressly states that for purposes of intestate
succession, the child must be born within ten months of the
parent's death. 130 Under these two statutes, a posthumously
UPA § 204 (2002).
Va. Code Ann. § 20-158(B) (Michie 1995). As to embryos implanted before the
death of the parent, the statute states in part that "[alny child resulting from the insemination of a wife's ovum using her husband's sperm, with his consent, is the child of
the husband and wife notwithstanding that, during the ten-month period immediately
preceding the birth, either party died." [d.
127

128

129

[d.

130

Va. Code Ann. § 20-164.
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conceived child would not qualify as "child" unless her mother
was impregnated immediately after her father died, even if he
had stated his intent to father a child.
There is even more confusion in states such as Florida that
address the status of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction only in the context of marital children. 131 Offspring born within wedlock are presumed to be the "children"
of the husband and wife, whereas a child conceived after the
death of a parent is not, even if the biological relationship is
established. 132 As a result, in these states, although a posthumously conceived child can take under a deceased parent's will,
she does not have a legal parent-child relationship that would
allow her to inherit under intestate succession. 133
Another state, however, directly addresses the issue of
posthumously conceived children and specifically excludes
them from any inheritance rights. 13' Under Louisiana law, "legitimate" children are defined as "either born or conceived during marriage or [those] who have been legitimated" and
"[i]llegitimate children are those who are conceived and born
out of marriage.'''35 No distinction or exception is made for
posthumously conceived children. 136
As a result of varying state laws, children may be prevented from establishing natural child status or ability to inherit through intestate succession in some states, whereas under the ruling in Gillett-Netting, children in Arizona may get
benefits under a more lenient test. Moreover, the reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit in previous cases awarding benefits is not
consistent with the court's reasoning in Gillett-Netting.
137

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.11 (West 1997).
[d. The statute requires that both parents consented in writing to the artificial
or in vitro insemination. [d.
133 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17 (West 1997) ("[AJ child conceived from the eggs or
sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm or
pre-embryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's
estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's will.").
134 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1474 (West Supp. 1996).
In Louisiana, to receive an
inter vivos gift, the child must be in utero at the time the donation was made; to receive a donation by mortis causa ("in the contemplation of death"), the unborn child
must be in utero at the time of the testator's death. In other words, children have the
capacity to inherit only if they exist at the time of the parent's death. [d.
135 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 179 and 180.
136 [d.
137 Moorehead v. Bowen, 784 F.2d 978 (9th Cir 1986); Moreno v. Richardson, 484
F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1973).
131

132
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Where the Ninth Circuit awarded benefits to a non-marital
child who had been acknowledged by the father, the court's ruling was not based on the undisputed fact that the child was the
"natural child" of the insured wage earner and therefore presumed dependent; instead, the court first relied on the state
law of inheritance to establish that the child was "legitimate. "'38
It then determined that this status was sufficient for the child
to inherit under intestate succession. 130
In an even earlier case, the Ninth Circuit looked beyond
the father's admission that he was the father of the nonmarital child in question and instead looked at whether the
child had been legitimated under state law. o In contrast with
its reasoning in Gillett-Netting, the wage earner's acknowledgment of being the natural father of the child was not sufficient
in itself for a determination of the status of "child" for purposes
of qualifying for benefits under the Act.
I

'

I 1
'

B.

NINTH CIRCUIT'S STANDARD DOES NOT SERVE THE GOAlS
OF THE ACT

Eligibility for survivor benefits is based partially on state
law, yet the majority of states have not yet determined the
rights of these children; as a result, this federal law will not be
applied uniformly across all states. Without clarification of the
terms used in the Act, the goals of the Administration, including avoiding individual determinations of dependency and providing support for dependents of an insured wage earner, will
not be met. I ' 2 The Ninth Circuit's ruling would be most persuasive where the state statutes expressly address the status of
posthumously conceived children. 143 When a statute already
138 Moorehead, 784 F.2d at 978. (noting that under Cal. Prob. Code § 255, a par·
ent-child relationship was established, making the child "legitimate for purposes of
inheritance. ").
139 Moorehead, 784 F.2d at 978.
140 Moreno v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing Cal. Civ. Code
§ 230, which states, "[tlhe father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it
as his won, receiving it as such . . . and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate
child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of its birth.").
141 Moreno, 484 F.2d at 90l.
142 See supra note 8.
1.. Ann. Cal. Prob. Code § 249.5 (West 2005). Posthumously conceived children
are deemed to be born "in the lifetime of the decedent" if the decedent had specified in
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provides that children in this category can establish a natural
parent-child relationship that is recognized for purposes of intestate succession, the standard put forth in the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Gillett-Netting becomes merely an alternative argument for the granting of benefits. W When state law is not so
well defined, the ruling in this case can add to the uncertainty
of the result.
Using categories for purposes of determining dependency
of non-marital children has been justified because without the
categories, dependency would have to be determined on a
case-by-case basis with several results. 145 First, the definition of
"dependent" used by each ALJ could differ. 146 Additional costs
of individualized determinations tend to reduce the level of
benefits.147 Finally, the greater variability would tax the principle that likes should be treated alike. '48 Variations in state
intestate succession laws that contradict the standard put forth
by the court will require case-by-case determination of eligibility for each posthumously conceived child who applies for benefits.
The goal of the use of legitimacy has been described as the
prevention of false claims; that is, the denial of benefits is justified because allowing benefits to non-marital children would
allow false claims. '49 The United States Supreme Court recognized the possibility that evidence of parentage or support may
be more likely to be fabricated when the child is not born until
after the wage earner has become entitled to benefits. 150 This
rationale could also apply to posthumously conceived children.
The Court found, however, that false claims were not prevented
by the policy that divides posthumously born non-marital children into two categories for purposes of determining eligibility
writing that his or her genetic material should be used to produce a child and the child
of the genetic material is in utero within two years of the person's death.
144 Cal. Prob. Code §§ 249.5(a)(b)(c) (West 2005) (requiring written confirmation
by the decedent authorizing the use of his or her genetic material for the conception of
a child after his or her death, written notice to the person responsible for the distribution of the estate to make him or her aware of the existence of the genetic material, and
conception within 2 years of the decedent's death.).
145 Trammell, 819 F.2d at 169.
146 [d.
147 [d.
148 [d.
149 Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 634.
160 [d.
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for benefits. 151 Those non-marital children who could inherit or
were legitimated under state law could qualify for survivor
benefits,152 while those who did not meet these criteria would be
denied benefits. 153 The Court held that the blanket exclusion of
this second category of non-marital children is not necessarily
reasonably related to the prevention of false claims because the
potential for false claims is exactly the same for both subclasses of non-marital children. 154
IV. CONCLUSION

New reproductive technologies require a change in substantive state law and the clarification of terms used in federal
and state statutes. Defining statutory terms is often inherently challenging, especially when emerging technology can
alter the meaning of those terms. The basis of the ruling of the
Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting diverges from that used in
many of the lower courts and that used in previous decisions by
the Ninth Circuit. These courts based eligibility on the right to
inherit under state intestate succession laws, whereas the
Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting looked at the biological connection between the parent and child in combination with a determination of legitimacy under state law. By not relying on a
consistent ground to determine eligibility, the Gillett-Netting
analysis necessitates a case-by-case determination, contrary to
the intent of the Administration, when it established categories
of children. As a result, claims of surviving children may be
denied solely because of the state they live in. This defeats the
purpose of the Act, which is to provide support to the survivors
of an insured individual. The law and terms within those laws
must be updated to encompass these new technologies and the
children that result from them.

KAREN MINOR'
[d. at 635-637.
[d. at 635-636.
153 [d. at 636.
154 [d .
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